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Abstract
According to Minsky, capitalism has an inherent tendency to financial instability: periods of 
boom are followed by financial crash. Thus, economic policies have to be proactive. For any 
economy, it is necessary at each point in time to assess the degree of potential instability, 
and the particular role played by monetary and fiscal policy. The purpose of this dissertation 
is to draw on Minsky’s theory and examine economic policy’s role in the formulation of a 
real estate bubble. With the help of a historical case study, this research examines how 
exogenous factors such as economic policies and endogenous factors such as positive 
expectations contribute to financial fragility. The case study chosen is that of Spain prior to 
2007, where rising financial instability culminated in the eventual bursting of a pronounced 
housing bubble. A quantitative descriptive analysis supported by a qualitative document 
review are chosen to provide an in-depth picture. It is shown that exogenous policy factors 
contributed to the crisis trigger and helped to exacerbate the boom. After introduction of the 
Euro single currency, profit opportunities arose, based on interest rate and growth 
differentials, leading to capital inflows from the European centre and rising fragility. Pro­
cyclical fiscal and monetary policy amplified positive expectations and further fuelled the 
housing bubble.
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1. Aims and Objectives
This chapter outlines significance and objectives of the research. Furthermore, a short 
introduction to the economic crisis under consideration, and the composition of the thesis, is 
given.
1.1 Statement of the Problem
“There is no possibility that we can ever set things right once and for all;
Instability, put to rest by one set of reforms, will, after time, emerge in new guise. ”
(Minsky, 1986a, p.370)
According to Minsky (1986a), capitalism has an inherent tendency to financial instability: 
periods of boom are followed by financial crash (called the Minsky moment). In opposition, 
the prevailing view in mainstream economics1 has been that unregulated markets lead to a 
stable economy. Already in 1987, Minsky saw the risk in the deregulation process as that of 
home-mortgage securitization, which were some of the underlying causes of the Global 
Financial Crisis originating in the US.
The Global Financial Crisis starting in 2007 is considered to be the most severe crisis since 
the Great Depression in the 1930s (Wray, 2009). In the run up to it, the US and a number of 
European countries underwent an unprecedented housing investment boom. In Spain, 
residential property prices rose by 140% from 2000 up until 2006. The average annual 
growth rate of property prices nearly doubled, from 7.5% in the five years prior to the boom 
(1997-2001) to 15% between 2002 and 2006. Even in Ireland which also experienced an 
exceptional housing boom, property prices rose not as much in the same time period (109%; 
BIS, 2015). After the bubble burst, Spain’s real GDP growth dropped from 4.2% in 2006 to 
-3.6% in 2009 (OECD, 2015). In the process of dealing with the crisis, private debt became 
sovereign debt and taxpayers are bearing the consequences of the crisis (Forster et al., 2011).
1 Including neoclassical economics and neoclassical synthesis (Munoz, 2011)
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Financial deregulation in connection with a monetary policy controlling inflation deepened 
instability and shifted power towards financial markets (Minsky, 1986a, pp. 182,280). Even 
though the political power of finance was weakened in the aftermath of the Global Financial 
Crisis, it soon gained momentum again, which can be seen in the huge bonuses paid by AIG 
after having received substantial bail-outs (Epstein et al., 2009). At the same time, Europe 
experienced a power shift towards capital interests with the European centre arguing for 
austerity policies (Stockhammer and Sotiropoulos, 2014). The reaction of the US and 
European governments towards the crisis revealed a focus on the functioning of financial 
markets instead of on a stable economy with fair wages and high employment.
Minsky (1987) recognized early that the recent development of capitalism leads to rising 
financial fragility. Pro-growth policies supporting the supply side and promoting investment 
are misleading policy objectives (Minsky, 1964). In his financial instability hypothesis he 
emphasizes the tendency of stable economies to move towards instability due to excessive 
optimism resulting in high debt levels (Minsky, 1985). A proper policy discussion should 
accept an economic theory which incorporates this inherent instability of capitalism and 
examine how institutions and policies exacerbate it (Minsky and Whalen, 1997). The 
particular purpose of this study is to draw on Minsky’s theory and examine economic 
policy’s role in the formulation of real estate bubbles.
1.2 Research Objectives
From Minsky’s perspective, monetary and financial systems are central to capitalism. Since 
a capitalist economy consists of profit-seeking individuals, focused on their own interests, 
the financial system is even unstable when economic agents act rationally. Policies which 
have been considered appropriate in the past lose their effectiveness due to rising financial 
innovation. Thus, economic policies have to be proactive and constantly adjust to new
2
circumstances. It is necessary to detect the current stage of an economy and acknowledge 
the influence of monetary and fiscal policy2 (Tymoigne and Wray, 2014).
In the Global Financial Crisis, a particular concern for economic policy has been the problem 
of real estate bubbles with unprecedented housing investment levels (Frenkel, 2013). To 
examine economic policies’ impact in this context, it needs to be investigated first if 
Minsky’s ideas apply to open economies since he developed them in a quite closed 
economy3. Thus, the project aims to answer the following research questions:
1) To what extent does Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis apply to an open 
economy experiencing a real estate bubble?
2) Looking at the causes of economic crises, in light of Minsky’s framework how 
do monetary and fiscal policies influence financial fragility?
The goal is to explore how exogenous factors such as economic policies and endogenous 
factors such as credit creation contribute to the transition towards a financially fragile 
economy. As an outcome, a macroeconomic framework (including fiscal and monetary 
policy) is presented which describes the causal chain towards fragility. After having 
conducted a literature review, this research examines the following mechanisms:
Causal mechanism 1:
Due to policy-induced financial integration, cross-national capital inflows rise. The 
subsequent increase in credit availability stimulates housing investment. Rising house prices 
validate past decisions and positive expectations develop endogenously. This feeds back into 
declining risk perceptions andfurther investment growth resulting in financial fragility.
Causal mechanism 2:
Pro-growth fiscal and expansionary monetary policies reinforce the bubble development.
A historical case study analysis is proposed here as a vehicle for investigating these issues 
in depth. The thesis explores how policy formation can be informed by applying Minsky’s 
theory in an open economy and by setting the role of policy in a historical perspective.
2 It manages taxation and public spending; monetary policy manages money supply and/or interest rates 
(Trigg, 2013).
3 US exports account for 13% of GDP which is the lowest level of a developed nation (Barone, 2014).
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1.3 Introduction to Spain’s Economic Crisis
After the Euro introduction in 1999, capital inflows to Southern European countries such as
Spain increased considerably resulting in growing credit availability. Due to elimination of
currency risks, lower financing costs and rising growth and real interest rate differentials,
positive expectations of profits arose (Frenkel, 2013). Spain was seen as an example how
‘sound’ public finances and economic reforms contribute to sustainable economic growth:
“This marks a break with the performance pattern of the Spanish economy in past cycles, 
when it would outgrow the European average at times of expansion only to sink further in the 
contraction phase [...]”(Kingdom of Spain, 2002, p.6; emphasis added)
“This reform process, which now has been ongoing for the last three decades, has put Spain’s 
public finances on a sound footing and it represents one of the most identifiable key factors 
behind the ‘Spanish economic miracle’.” (Martinez-Vazquez, 2007, p.532; emphasis added)
Between 1996 and 2007, Spain’s economic growth and employment were growing
significantly while running a nearly balanced budget since 2000. From 2000 until 2007, real
GDP grew on average by 3.8% per year, being 1 to 1.5 percentage points higher than the
Eurozone average, and the unemployment rate fell in just four years by more than 2
percentage points (between 2002 and 2005). The country changed from an emigration
country to an immigration country, which can be seen in the net migration rate which shows
the difference between persons leaving the country (emigration) and persons entering the
country (immigration) per 1,000 inhabitants. The net migration rate stayed on average
around 15.7% between 2002 and 2006, signalling significantly higher immigration than
emigration (Eurostat, 2015). Furthermore, Spanish inflation rates were quite low compared
to before the Euro. Inflation based on consumer prices moved from its highest point of 7.1%
in 1992 to 1.8% in 1998, and stayed on average at 3.3% during the boom years (OECD,
2015).
At the same time, however, competitiveness went down, accompanied by an unbalanced 
growth in the construction sector. According to the OECD (2015), competitiveness, a 
country’s ability to sell products in global markets, can be analysed with the help of unit
labour costs and inflation relative to foreign markets. Although the inflation rate has been 
falling in Spain, it was on average 1 percentage point higher than the Eurozone average. 
Furthermore, unit labour costs rose by 15.8% in Spain between 2000 and 2006 compared to 
7.6% increase in the Eurozone (OECD, 2015). At the peak of the housing boom in 2006, 
Spain was developing as many dwellings as the European Union altogether. Construction 
workers comprised 13% of employment (compared to 10% before the boom) and the 
construction sector added 10% to GDP (compared to 7% before the boom; Suarez, 2010).
This unbalanced growth was financed with increasing debt, hence, becoming unsustainable 
in the process. Spain’s household debt reached 72% of GDP in 2006, rising from 45% of 
GDP in 2002 (Eurostat, 2015). Growing financial fragility of households and non-financial 
corporations was accompanied by an unprecedented rise of asset prices. However, due to 
increasing economic growth and household wealth, Spain was considered to be an 
“economic miracle” which “even puzzled economists” (Atkins and Crawford, 2005).
1.4 Composition of Dissertation
The thesis is structured into six chapters. Chapter 1 provides research background and 
objectives guiding the research. A literature review with focus on Minsky’s financial 
instability hypothesis is presented in Chapter 2. Relevant empirical and theoretical literature 
is identified and the research significance highlighted. Chapter 3 states the chosen data 
collection methods and discusses the reasons for selecting them. Subsequently, a case study 
analysis is conducted based on an open economy experiencing a real estate bubble. It 
positions the capital inflows and rising indebtedness levels within a broader context of 
changes in fiscal and monetary policies. Chapter 6 discusses the findings with the help of a 
macroeconomic framework. This section concludes and reflects on implications for a future 
study.
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2. Literature Review
This literature review seeks to identify economic policies previously analysed in the 
Minskian literature and identify possible gaps requiring further research. It concentrates on 
the following topics: economic policies, global context for these policies, property bubbles.
2.1Minsky-Kindleberger Crisis Model
Before outlining basic aspects of the Minsky-Kindleberger model, mainstream arguments 
on causes of financial crises are briefly presented. According to mainstream economics, 
markets stabilize themselves in the long term. Thus, booms and busts are not created by the 
market but by exogenous factors, e.g. fiscal imbalances or lagged monetary policy. Since 
policy intervention disrupts the market, it should be limited in its scope and deregulation 
promoted (Minsky, 1986a, pp.50-51). Money supply and credit availability are considered 
to be exogenous factors. Debt-financed investment is constrained by savings and changes in 
the money supply, initiated by the central bank (Minsky, 1986a, pp. 125-126, 252-253).
Minsky (1986a, pp. 125-131) criticized the assumptions of mainstream economics which 
considers money to be neutral and the economy, as Minsky (1986a, p. 114) calls it, to be a 
“village fair”. Instead he places finance at the centre of his business cycle model, with 
financial and real markets interrelated. Supplying the economy with credit, banks can 
generate spending power, thus, aggregate demand. Hence, money supply is endogenously 
determined by the finance demand of the private sector: described in the Post-Keynesian 
literature as “loans create deposits” (Lavoie, 2006, p.57).
With the help of his financial instability hypothesis, Minsky (1986a, pp.193, 219, 240) 
showed how changes in investment and expectations can lead endogenously to financial 
fragility characterized by rising indebtedness of the private sector. Investment is not only the 
main driver of aggregate demand but is also dependent on the expectations of future
aggregate demand (Fazzari and Papadimitriou, 1992, p. 167). Minsky’s insights can be 
combined with phases of a bubble identified by Kindleberger (Kindleberger and Aliber, 
2005).
The Minsky-Kindleberger crisis model starts with a displacement such as a change in 
monetary policy leading to a profit increase in one sector of the economy. The expanding 
economy increases the optimism of the market resulting in extensive credit availability, thus, 
in a boom. Due to expectations of increasing profits and speculation, investment rises leading 
to higher asset prices. This results in a significant rise of debt levels (especially short-term 
debt) and an increase in speculative and Ponzi4 units in the euphoria phase. Financial 
innovation and riskier practices are introduced and money is created endogenously. In the 
next phase, called profit taking, some investors reduce their investment positions. Since 
market fragility is high a surprise event such as a well-known firm default can lead to panic 
followed by crisis (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005).
Besides having discussed the endogenous fragility of financial markets, Minsky (1986a) also 
recognized the essential role of institutions in the development of a bubble. Hence, he 
integrated endogenous and exogenous factors. The business cycle is influenced by the 
inherent tendency to instability based on the behaviour of economic agents; but institutional 
settings and economic policies play a central role in the development of expectations and the 
resulting credit creation. If in the above mentioned displacement financial constraints are 
loosened, positive expectations develop leading to a rise of credit supply. This rising fragility 
results in instability in the moment the financial sector problems spread to the real sector 
(Tymoigne and Wray, 2014). Even though policy changes might be the trigger for the boom
4 The firm must borrow to meet current payments and has increasing outstanding debt.
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and bust, expectations and pro-cyclical credit creation are inherent factors of the system 
(Kregel, 1998).
Table 1 Overview of Endogenous and Exogenous Factors 
Displacement______________________________________________________________________
Exogenous
Endogenous
Euphoria/Boom
Policy trigger
Tranquile, economic period
New profit opportunities
Stability leads to optimism and financial innovation
Exogenous 
Endogenous 
Profit Taking
Deregulation 
Rising profits
Increase in credit availability 
Movement towards Ponzi finance
Exogenous
Endogenous
Panic
Restrictive monetary policy 
Unsustainable debt levels Well-informed investors leave the market
Exogenous
Endogenous
Stabilization policies 
Reversal of expectations
Prevention of debt deflation process 
Insufficiency of profits in relation to debt
Source: Author’s presentation based on Minsky (1964, 1985, 1986a, 1995), Kindleberger and Aliber (2005) 
As acknowledged by Cruz et al. (2006) and Mulligan (2013), review and further 
development of Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis has increased considerably, but 
empirical studies are still relatively rare. It is argued, moreover, in the next section that an 
in-depth research of economic policies’ impact in the build-up of financial instability is 
missing in the Minskian literature.
2.2 Analysis of Economic Policies
When looking at the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and its impact on the economy, 
the role of policy has emerged as a key issue. Central bankers such as Alan Greenspan have 
admitted that policies (e.g. low interest rates) before the crisis were flawed, promoting an 
economic bubble (Andrews, 2008). In this context, it becomes important to include fiscal 
and monetary policy in an examination of financial crises. Minsky (1986a, p.43) discussed 
two policy approaches which prevent a debt deflation process: big government and big bank. 
The government uses counter-cyclical fiscal policies and the central bank acts as a lender of 
last resort. At the same time, Minsky recognized that those actions validate risky behaviour. 
Thus, it is necessary to restructure the economy after a crisis occurs such as the breaking up 
of too big to fa il institutions (Wray, 201 la).
In recent years, literature on the efficacy of big bank and Minsky’s financial reform 
suggestions has increased (Kregel, 2014). Zalewski (2012) discusses policy tools used by 
the US government to put a lower ceiling on housing prices. The author concludes that it 
fails in its task as a lender of last resort because of not recognizing the endogenous character 
of financial markets. Programmes to restructure loans were not properly transferred from the 
banking to the household sector. Banks used difficult calculations to restructure only 
potentially profitable loans. Furthermore, Wray (2011b) argues that monetary policy alone 
cannot increase aggregate demand in a recession, due to low expectations. This aspect was 
also acknowledged by Frenkel and Rapetti (2009) who state that conventional and 
unconventional measures such as quantitative easing cannot boost aggregate demand. Even 
though diverse studies give valuable insights into how Minsky’s big bank policies can be 
applied, the main focus is on the US.
According to Minsky (1964), fiscal policy is the most important policy tool due to being able 
to stimulate final demand. He criticized pro-growth strategies (e.g. tax credits for 
investment) which favour capital incomes and recognized that high investment can have 
destabilizing forces (Minsky, 1967). Papadimitriou and Wray (1997) provide a theoretical 
discussion of Minsky’s big government proposal and reform agenda. Recently, De Santana 
Vasconcelos (2014) and Tcherneva (2011) examined the importance of big government and 
Minsky’s call for directing policies towards full employment. Those papers give more 
insights into Minsky’s views on the scope of big government. However, they are mainly 
theoretical discussions in relation to the US. An analysis of how fiscal policy contributes to 
the bubble development under the light of Minsky’s framework has not been conducted. 
Even though Kregel (2015) sheds light on the impact of a Maastricht Treaty compliant fiscal 
policy on the external and/or private sector of the Eurozone, a detailed country analysis is 
missing.
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Minsky (1986a, p.20) recognized the importance of monetary and fiscal policy in relation to 
instability. If in a fragile economy key interest rates are raised, a reversal of present-value 
calculations can take place resulting in panic. Taking this argumentation further, low interest 
rates contribute to decreasing debt servicing costs and rising finance demand. In light of 
fiscal policy, Minsky (1986a, p. 35) shows that in a closed economy business investment 
and government spending are determining factors of taxes and profits. A focus on austerity 
policy while the economy is experiencing falling investment results in decreasing profits. 
The lack of profits to repay debt leads to increasing indebtedness and financial fragility. 
Thus, the government in relation to GDP should be at least as large as private investment to 
sustain aggregate demand (Minsky, 1986a, pp. 330-332).
In sum, literature on Minsky’s suggestions on big bank and big government has increased in 
recent years. However, the discussions seem to centre around measures in crisis situations, 
whereas analysis of the influence of policies prior to crisis situations is limited. The case can 
be made that it is essential to not only examine fiscal policy after the burst of a bubble but 
also in the development of the bubble; since pro-growth policies and an expansionary 
monetary policy can lead to inflationary pressures and support asset price bubbles. 
Furthermore, one problem with the Minskian literature is that it has tended to focus on the 
US, which is also discussed subsequently.
2.3 Minsky in an Open Economy
Already in 2000, Palley recognized the tendency of “financial capital to veto policy 
decisions” by flowing out of a country and favouring policies contrary to the interest of 
labour (Palley, 2000, p.33). This could be seen in the financial crisis. Investors fled European 
periphery countries and interest rates spiked, leading to a call for austerity policies. Thus, it 
is essential to investigate Minsky’s theoretical framework in an open economy.
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Wolfson (2002) and Arestis and Glickman (2002) show how Minsky’s model can be 
extended to the Asian Crisis of 1997/1998. The displacement is an opening up of the banking 
sector to the global market and the ability to use interest rate differentials. By borrowing in 
low interest rate countries and lending to high interest rate countries, profits are generated. 
This profit rise leads to optimistic expectations of future asset prices fuelling a boom. 
Additionally, Kregel (1998) discusses the influence of a stable exchange rate policy, which 
increases optimism and leads to rising foreign debt making a country vulnerable to external 
changes. Hence, Minsky’s model is extended by adding two exogenous shocks: a change in 
exchange rates and in the monetary policy of the largest international lenders. These shocks 
accelerate the endogenous movement from financial fragility to financial instability (Kregel, 
1998). However, in a monetary union exchange rate and monetary policy is the same for a 
diverse set of countries which have different economic stages. Thus, it is necessary to 
examine Minsky in an open economy which is part of a monetary union.
Furthermore, Kregel (1998) and Dymski (1999) include a brief discussion on the limitations 
of big bank and big government. Expansionary monetary policy in an open economy might 
result in capital outflows leading to a devaluation of the exchange rate and worsening the 
macro-economic situation, especially in a mainly importing country with high external debt 
(Kregel, 1998). Furthermore, big government depends on political forces. Because of the 
implementation of counter-cyclical fiscal policies in the 1970s and 1980s and avoiding the 
cleansing of insolvent institutions, the US experienced increasing inflation leading to less 
support of big government (Dymski, 1999). Despite those inclusions of policies in the 
analysis of the Asian Crisis, a thorough policy discussion prior to a crisis is missing. 
Surprisingly, aspects such as fiscal policy, including quantity and quality of taxes and 
expenditures, in connection with monetary policy are not discussed.
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In addition to the Asian crisis, the Global Financial Crisis has been analysed in light of the 
financial instability hypothesis. Wray (201 la, 201 lb) argues that it fits Minsky’s theory, but 
it should be seen as a result of a long-term transformation of the economy. His analysis 
concentrates on the historical development of the US. Furthermore, Wray (2012) and 
Dymski (2010) point out that household debt, in connection with rising financial innovation 
and further layering of debt, led to the Global Financial Crisis. Thus, the main driver of the 
crisis was not corporate debt, as in Minsky’s analysis, but household debt. In contrast, Kregel 
(2008) and Davidson (2008) argue that it is not an endogenous development based on 
underestimation of credit risks of the borrowers, but based on the “originate and distribute” 
system. Hence, the defined margins of safety by Minsky were insufficient from the 
beginning. When looking at the US, the case can be made that household debt was caused 
by a long-term transformation of the system and by an increase during the boom years due 
to financial innovation. The above shown theoretical discussions are concentrating on the 
US. The focus lies on financial reforms without taking into consideration economic policies’ 
impact prior to a crisis.
Frenkel and Rapetti (2009) combined an analysis of the recent Global Financial Crisis and 
developing country’s crises such as the Asian Crisis 1997/1998. They claim that the 
difference between developing and developed countries lies in the trigger of the 
displacement, being an exogenous one in the developing countries and an endogenous 
movement in the developed countries. However, in 2013, Frenkel states that peripheral 
Eurozone countries experienced the same exogenous trigger as emerging countries. 
Nevertheless, he does not provide empirical evidence for this claim and refers to a paper 
written by Bagnai (2012). Bagnai (2012) shows with the help of Frenkel and Rapetti’s (2009) 
interpretation of Minsky’s framework how the European crisis was caused by private and 
not public debt. Despite giving an overview of the European crisis and its exogenous trigger, 
a discussion of fiscal policy is missing.
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Even though the studies above provide an empirical and theoretical discussion of the 
displacement, they are not taking into consideration a combination of fiscal and monetary 
policy during the bubble development. Their focus lies on monetary policy including interest 
rates and financial deregulation. However, it would have been interesting to see if favourable 
taxes on capital gains existed in the analysed countries. As shown above, what is largely 
absent in the Minskian literature is a joint analysis of the impact of monetary and fiscal 
policy on the bubble development (see Table 2 and Appendix 1).
Table 2 Overview of Main Fiscal Policy Literature
Literature Policy Country Time Approach Missing
Fiscal Policy
Kregel (2015) 
Tokucu (2014)
Size of 
government
EU
Turkey
Theoretical
Theoretical
Empirical
Focus on sectoral balances; 
no discussion of fiscal policy 
scope
De Santana 
Vasconcelos 
(2014)
Size and 
scope of 
government
US Theoretical No empirical data or crisis 
perspective
Frenkel (2013)
Focus on
Europe
Argentina
GFC5 Theoretical Eurozone narrative, no 
empirical data
Wray (2011 a,b) crisis
response
US GFC Mainly
theoretical
No connection between 
monetary and fiscal policy
Open Economy and Fiscal Policy
Arestis and 
Glickman (2002 
Frenkel and 
Rapetti (2009 
Bagnai (2012))
Brief
discussion on 
fiscal policy 
responses
Asian and 
Latin 
America
Theoretical
Empirical
No detailed policy discussion 
prior to crisis
Tymoigne and 
Wray (2014)
Policy 
Responses, 
Financial 
Reform, 
Employer of 
last resort
US GFC Theoretical
Empirical
No detailed policy discussion 
prior to crisis
Employer o f  Last Resort
Forestater Employer of US - Theoretical No empirical data
(2013) last resort
Kaboub (2007)
Tcherneva
(2011)
Wray (2011b)
5 GFC = Global Financial Crisis
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2.4 Minsky and Property Bubbles
Minsky’s hypothesis has also been analysed in the context of the housing sector. Palley 
(1994) combines Minsky’s view on debt and Kaldor’s aggregate demand model, arguing 
that rising access to finance can create an asset bubble. Rising debt first increases aggregate 
demand but due to higher debt servicing costs it eventually decreases. This is due to the fact 
that money is transferred from debtors with a high propensity to consume to creditors with 
a low propensity to consume. But this model excludes mortgage debt and the possibility of 
a significant fall in interest rates. This gap is partly filled by a study conducted by Tymoigne 
(2014) who includes mortgage-debt into the calculation of a financial fragility index for the 
housing sector. This index shows a substantial increase in financial fragility in the US. 
Nevertheless, Tymoigne (2014) himself acknowledged that available data is not sufficient 
to appropriately measure risks and develop policy recommendations; for example, the debt- 
to-income ratio does not include free tax income but after-tax income. Furthermore, 
economic policy decisions or institutional settings are not included.
In recent years, numerous studies (Cynamon and Fazzari, 2015; Stockhammer, 2015) have 
analysed the connection between rising income inequality, financialisation and housing 
bubbles in advanced economies. They argue that the financial deregulation and stagnating 
incomes led to compensatory spending by households resulting in a housing bubble. 
However, when looking at inequality indices in Spain prior to the crisis, income inequality 
was not significant. Overall net disposable income of households increased by 26.7% and 
income share including capital gains of the top 10%-5% even slightly decreased from 
10.99% to 10.57% (AMECO, 2015; World Top Incomes Database, 2015).
The secondary literature has developed Minsky’s views into a more sophisticated hypothesis 
by adapting it to the household sector and to the global environment. Thus, it provides 
valuable insights which are helpful in further research. Nevertheless, few systematic
attempts have been made to analyse monetary policy and fiscal policy in an integrated 
fashion. Moreover, literature on Minsky’s policy suggestions seems to be centred around 
measures to resolve crisis situations without an in-depth analysis of how economic policies 
influence the development of an asset bubble. Hence, Minsky’s suggestion on the size and 
scope of government in non-crisis situations has not been examined further. Moreover, the 
discussion on Minsky in a global context has remained mainly theoretical with a strong focus 
on the US. Therefore, the aim of this dissertation is to analyse fiscal and monetary policy 
prior to the burst of a housing bubble in light of Minsky’s crisis model.
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3 M ethods o f Data Collection
After having identified the research topic and its significance, this chapter presents the 
research strategy including data collection methods.
3.1 Design of Research Project
Since the research focus lies on explaining economic policies' influence on the underlying 
causes of property bubbles, retroduction as a research strategy appears to be appropriate. 
Retroductive research uses hypothetical models to seek answers to ‘why’ and ‘how’ 
questions. The major task of retroduction is explanation and not prediction. The goal is to 
explain underlying causal mechanisms for an empirical phenomenon (Blaikie, 2009). An 
overview of the research design is presented below.
Table 3 Elements of Research Design (Adapted from Blaikie, 2009)
Purpose o f  
researchI J
•Critical assessment of economic policies’ role prior to 
economic crisis situations framed around Minsky’s 
financial instability hypothesis.
/' \
R esearch
Strategy
v  . J
•Retroduction: use of hypothetical models to seek answers 
to ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions
f  X
R esearch
Paradigm
v  J
•Critical realism paradigm: whole or final truth may not 
be observable, reality consists o f different domains
r  a
M ethodo logy
L....... y
•Historical case study approach: to draw causal inferences 
on how economic policies affect the occurrence of a 
bubble
It has been argued by heterodox economists that research in mainstream economics has 
concentrated on mathematical models which cannot portray open systems with endogenous 
factors (Downward and Mearman, 2007). Such models are based on unrealistic assumptions 
such as that the economy is made up of representative agents who have rational expectations. 
Thus, the real world cannot be depicted which leads to wrong policy decisions (Lawson, 
2009). Minsky himself acknowledged that mathematical formulas cannot take account of the 
complexity o f the real world. He believed that an economic theory cannot be independent
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from institutional settings and be universally applicable to a diverse set of economies 
(Minsky, 1986a, pp. 4, 118).
Due to the brief presentation of the criticism of mainstream methodologies and Minsky’s 
take on mathematical, quantitative models, the selected methodology for this study is a case 
study. A case study approach is chosen in order to draw causal inferences on how economic 
policies affect the occurrence of a bubble under the purview of Minsky’s financial instability 
hypothesis. This approach is distinctive in systematically highlighting the link between fiscal 
and monetary policy and increasing fragility in property bubbles. The appropriateness of a 
case study is further discussed in section 3.3.
3.2 Research Strategy and Paradigm
As shown above, the underlying research strategy is retroduction. Minsky’s financial 
instability hypothesis guides data collection and analysis process. Relevant data in form of 
secondary data is gathered, analysed and non-conforming cases identified. By going back to 
the data and hypothesis, causal mechanisms are identified which provide the best 
explanations for the observed phenomenon (Blaikie, 2009). According to Blaikie (2009), a 
retroductive research strategy feeds into a critical realism paradigm. Hence, the whole or 
final truth may not be observable since reality consists of different domains such as 
empirical, actual and real domain. The empirical domain consists of events which are 
observed by the researcher whereas the actual domain is the reality which exists without 
necessarily observing it. Since the real domain is comprised of underlying causal 
mechanisms which are not accessible, it is necessary to develop hypotheses (Downward and 
Mearman, 2007). Therefore, Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis is not tested in the 
positive sense but by studying a particular case in order to understand extent and nature of 
the selected country and to gain causal insights into the mechanisms (Lee, 2012).
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3.3 Data Collection Methods
A case study focuses on a single unit of analysis, studies it in-depth and uses multiple 
methods. According to Yin (2003) this approach is applicable to descriptive and explanatory 
research since it includes description and interpretation of events and is suitable when any 
conclusions drawn are dependent on the context. Moreover, Olsen (2012) argues that case 
study approach is appropriate when the focus lies not on mathematical determined cause and 
effect relationships but on portraying how diverse factors such as class background, or in 
this case macro-economic policies, lead to a complex development such as workers’ 
resistance, or financial fragility respectively. Hence, it is necessary to examine how 
outcomes depend on historical and macro specific developments, since events might be 
contingent and have diverse possible outcomes (Lee, 2012). A case study approach allows 
for such an in-depth examination.
Furthermore, case study research can combine qualitative and quantitative approaches and 
overcome the disadvantages of each (Yin, 2003). As pointed out above, quantitative research 
might leave out essential causal mechanisms because of not being able to model them or 
building too many prior assumptions into the research design; thus limit the study in itself 
and loose flexibility. In contrast, qualitative research might be too subjective. Even though 
causal inferences can be drawn, qualitative research cannot be generalized to a wider context 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003). Hence, consistent with the research design and underlying 
philosophy the following data collection methods are employed:
Quantitative: data collection of economic indicators
Qualitative: review of secondary sources such as policy documents and newspapers 
By combining qualitative and quantitative methods, the studied phenomena can be looked 
at from different angles in order to provide a more holistic view and detect underlying causal 
mechanisms.
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As shown in the literature review, previous studies have been concentrating on the US 
experience which is a relatively closed country and a peculiar case since it provides the 
global key currency. To test Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis in a wider context, it 
is helpful to conduct an analysis based on an open economy. As shown in section 1.3, Spain 
has been chosen for this project. Kohn (1989) argues for diverse cases if a hypothesis is to 
be tested and a phenomenon’s universality is examined. At the same time, the cases have to 
be comparable. Therefore, in this research, Spain was chosen based on the similarity with 
the US of experiencing a housing bubble. However, Spain differs significantly from the US 
in its institutional settings and exchange rate system. Spain is an open economy and part of 
a monetary union (Frenkel and Rapetti, 2009).
3.4 Methodological Challenges
In the following, methodological challenges are briefly discussed. The use of secondary data 
might lead to complications. Since the researcher does not have control over how the data is 
collected and presented, the data needs to be analysed cautiously. If economic indicators 
from diverse databases are used, it is essential to ensure their reliability and validity. Thus, 
the researcher needs to verify that it is an official, reliable source such as the IMF database. 
Furthermore, official statistics can be misleading, especially aspects concerning financial 
data. Different countries/sources might use different calculations for the same indicators. 
The researcher needs to be aware of this and examine the underlying calculations used. 
Besides general methodological challenges, ethical issues have to be considered. It is the 
responsibility of the researcher not to manipulate data in order to receive the desired results. 
Since the researcher can choose which data to use and what kind of analyses to do, the 
subjectivity might be high. The researcher needs to be aware of such aspects (Bryman and 
Bell, 2003).
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4 Collecting and Analysing the Data
In the following, the analytical research framework in connection with the quantitative and 
qualitative analysis’ strategy is presented.
4.1 Strategy for Data Analysis
Based on Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis, a quantitative analysis with the help of 
economic indicators and a qualitative description of the policy background is provided. The 
broad timeframe is between 2000 up until 2006, with focus on the development of the bubble 
after the hard currency introduction of the Euro in 2002. The period until 2006 is chosen due 
to reaching the peak of the housing bubble in 2006 (EC, 2012). The longer-term business 
cycle can be argued to have started in 1994 because of rising house prices and GDP growth 
(see Figure 1). Since Minsky (1985) defined the business cycle under the light of increasing 
fragility and private and external deficits as well as house prices behaved quite moderately 
with a clear change taking place in 2002, the defined time period seems appropriate.
Figure 1 Real GDP Growth in %
6%
- 4%
- 6%
Source: OECD (2015)
4.2 Analytical Research Framework
Minsky based his theoretical framework on a closed economy model excluding the external 
sector in his main discussion (Minsky, 1986a, p. 169). Hence, it is essential to analyse 
economic policies’ impact on financial fragility in an open economy. This can be done with 
the help of the sectoral balances approach developed by Godley and Lavoie (2007) in 
connection with Kalecki’s profit equation (Minsky, 1986a, p. 163). The sectoral balances
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approach is a balance of payments identity which is shown below with S  as private savings,
/a s  private investment, G as government spending, T as taxes, X as exports and Mas imports:
(5 -  /) = (G -  T) + (X — M)
This means if in the case of a current account deficit, the government focuses on austerity
policy, the private sector has to run a deficit which increases financial fragility (Godley and
Lavoie, 2007). However, it is an ex-post relationship and does not include any causal
relationships.
Since fragility can increase due to not achieving targeted profits, Minsky (1985) uses
Kalecki’s profit equation to critically assess the impact of economic policy on private
sector’s profits. Kalecki reformulates the above shown identity and assumes that the
economy consists of two classes, workers and capitalists (Kalecki, 1971).6 Profit (n ) is
influenced by public deficit (D f ), balance of trade deficit defined as current account deficit
(BDf ), savings by workers (Sw) and consumption out of profits (Cn) (Kalecki, 1971, p. 82):
n  = /  + D / — BDf  — Sw +  Cn 
According to Kalecki (1971), the causality runs from demand factors on the right side to
profits. Thus, profits depend, amongst others, on changes in investment, government and
current account deficit. Falling profits can be offset with an increase of government
spending. Furthermore, higher profits are negatively correlated with rising current account
deficits, but positively related to capital account surpluses, thus, financial inflows.
Despite Kalecki’s assumed causality, it can be argued that the current account does not 
determine profits, but rather higher profits attract capital leading to growing capital inflows 
(Arestis and Glickman, 2002). Thus, profits are negatively related to current account deficits, 
but capital flows determine the causality. Those higher profit opportunities could be due to
6 Identity reformulation is shown in Appendix 2.
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financial aspects such as being possible to make on the carry because of interest rate 
differentials (Kregel, 1998). Borio (2014) also emphasizes that the main aspect in the recent 
financial crisis was not the current account development and the concomitant net capital 
flows, but increasing gross financial flows leading to unsustainable credit booms. Since net 
capital flows indicate the level of “saving-investment balances” but not the underlying 
financing, they reflect an ex post, not an ex ante view. Dependent on financial growth 
prospects trade in financial assets, hence, portfolio transactions, can be significantly higher 
than the resulting net capital flows (Borio and Disyatat, 2011, p. 1). Due to this contradictory 
point of view, the profit equation is applied as an identity without implying a Kaleckian 
causality.
The fiscal policy stance is followed up by an integration of monetary policy into the policy 
analysis. As already shown in the literature review, monetary policy plays an essential role. 
Due to the focus on price stability of most central banks, monetary policy tends to increase 
interest rates during the euphoria phase, thus, worsening private sector’s balance sheets. 
Furthermore, non-monetarily sovereign countries such as Spain have a budget constraint. If 
investors lose trust in the country’s ability to service its debt, they can invest in different 
European countries without incurring exchange rate risk (Tymoigne and Wray, 2014).
However, before being able to conduct an analysis of economic policies, trends and sources 
of financial fragility have to be examined. Additionally, the peculiarities of the household 
sector have to be taken into consideration. Households’ cash flows differ from companies’ 
cash flows since households do not generate cash inflows in the form of profits. Thus, the 
validation process takes place through a wealth effect due to rising house prices and 
increased equity withdrawals. Furthermore, if household spending is speculative it may 
increase corporate profits by entering into a negative growth rate of household savings 
(Tymoigne and Wray, 2014).
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4.3 Quantitative Analysis of Data
The data analysis approach is discussed subsequently. Since the focus is not on 
generalization, descriptive statistics are used to provide a description of the phenomenon but 
not to generalize to a wider sample based on inferential statistics. The descriptive 
quantitative part mainly consists of a distribution and central tendency analysis (Bryman and 
Bell, 2003).
To assess the fragility of the Spanish economy, fragility proxies are defined. According to 
the European Commission, the debt-to-income ratio is an appropriate indicator for 
households’ leverage (Cuerpo et al, 2013). Hence, households’ leverage is analysed with the 
help of the debt-to-income ratio whereas debt-to-GDP ratio is used for non-financial 
corporations. However, as pointed out by Sotiropoulos et al. (2013), leverage ratios in the 
corporate sector commonly put debt levels in relation to assets, thus, a stock in relation to a 
stock whereas the debt-to-income ratio puts a stock in relation to a flow. Therefore, it is 
necessary to examine the debt-to-asset ratio. This is followed by a discussion of providers 
of household debt, thus, the financial and external sector. The breakdown of bank loans and 
financial market regulations are discussed. Subsequently, an analysis of the size and 
composition of capital flows is provided in connection with tiers of capital flows defined by 
Minsky (1986b). Lastly, sectoral balances and the above mentioned profit equation are 
examined to detect economic policy’s impact on financial fragility. This is followed by an 
integrated discussion of monetary and fiscal policy.
4.4 Qualitative Analysis of Data
Since each country’s fiscal and monetary policy reflect a country’s institutional settings, it 
is essential to detect the reasoning behind policy decisions. Thus, the second part of the 
analysis consists of a qualitative document analysis.
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Before collecting documents, inclusion requirements need to be identified (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008). The main inclusion criteria for policy documents was being the main policy 
document. To assess fiscal policy, Stability Programmes provided by the Spanish 
government were examined since they present the fiscal policy strategy for the following 
years. Monetary policy decisions are included with the help of press releases by the European 
Central Bank (ECB). The years were chosen based on changes in the monetary policy 
(especially key interest rate changes). Furthermore, Nexis newspaper database was searched 
according to predefined terms such as Spanish economic growth to show how policy 
decisions and the economic development were reported in the media. Since this is an 
indicative study, the main focus lies on giving an overview. After having reviewed diverse 
documents, they were narrowed down towards a smaller amount of articles which were 
analysed (30 out of 74). The selection took place based on giving explicit reasons for policy 
decisions and mentioning of expectations. The overall presentation of documents reviewed 
can be found in Appendix 3.
As can be seen in Table 4, the focus of policy documents lies on financial market flexibility 
and supply-side reforms to promote economic growth. The Eurozone entry is related to 
positive aspects. Newspaper coverage also hints towards a positive picture of the Spanish 
economy up until mid-2004 and then slowly drifts towards a critical view of the Spanish 
‘economic miracle’. A recurring theme starting in 2004 is the risk of a real estate bubble in 
connection with rising interest rates. However, Bank of Spain Governor Caruana did not 
consider the Spanish property boom a bubble due to predicting a moderate decline of 
property prices (The Main Wire, 2005). Besides this overview, the results are given as 
illustrative quotes in the following discussion.
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Selected Amount 
Documents
Years Key Themes Detected
Stability 
Programmes o f  
Spain
ECB documents 
published online
The Main Wire
4 2001
2002
2004
2005
Focus on economic growth and balanced budget
Avoidance of discretionary fiscal policy and 
promoting supply-side growth; structural reforms 
(market openness and rising competition)
Construction negatively related to interest rates
4 05/12/2002 Focus on price stability and flexibility o f financial
08/05/2003 markets
19/11/2003 Benefits of large cross-border provision of financial
services
27/04/2004 Excess liquidity in Eurozone -  possibility of inflation
07/10/2005 Banks do not purely mediate but transfer risks to
other sectors
News reports focused on Bank o f Spain Governor
5 13/06/2003 Call for wage moderation
29/06/2004 Call for structural reforms
13/05/2005 Monetary policy should not target asset prices
The Banker
15/11/2005
05/01/2006
01/06/2006
Spain’s housing boom not a bubble, low probability 
of unorderly adjustment
Monetary policy should target asset prices 
Support of financial market flexibility and advantages 
of being part of the monetary union
Mortgage growth and household spending negatively 
related to interest rates
Newspapers
Years Newspaper Dates Key Themes Detected
2000 United Press Int. 
New York Times 
Newsweek
13/06/2000
22/06/2000
02/10/2000
Public Approval o f the Euro 
Spanish consumers confident 
Euro a blessing
2002 Agence France Presse 
Financial Times
19/04/2002
25/09/2002
European economy stronger than US 
Peculiarity of Spanish housing market
2003 Financial Times 
Agence France Presse 
Agence France Presse
17/04/2003
27/05/2003
11/11/2003
Mergers and acquisitions of property developers 
Spanish economy one of the strongest o f EU 
Prime minister targets full employment by 2010
2004 The Banker 
Financial Times 
Sunday Tribune
01/01/2004
07/07/2004
11/07/2004
Dismissal of property bubble 
Unsustainable property bubble 
Market is slowing down - real estate market is 
negatively related to interest rates
2005 Daily Mail 
New York Times
18/03/2005
20/05/2005
Sudden stop of Spain’s investment boom 
Spanish housing boom connected to monetary policy 
-  beneficial for Spain to be in the Eurozone
Financial Times 
Sunday Times
26/05/2005
09/10/2005
Spanish economic miracle gives riddles
Spanish property investment by non-residents falling
2006 Financial Times 11/11/2006 Economic culture of having to grow; mergers and 
acquisitions rise
Financial Times 
The Scotsman
25/10/2006 
29/11/2006
New profit opportunities: immigrants 
Spain’s economy turned vulnerable
Table 4 Report on Documents’ Analysis
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5 Interpretation of Data
In the following, the collected data is presented. Trends and sources of financial fragility are 
discussed followed by a sectoral balances’ analysis. In the end, an integrated analysis of 
fiscal and monetary policy is conducted.
5.1 Trends of Financial Fragility
Even though real income per capita grew between 2002 and 2005, Spain experienced a 
significant rise of household debt, hence, financial fragility. In only five years, debt in 
relation to gross disposable income (GDI) grew by 46 percentage points, even reaching 
124% of GDI in 2006 (see Appendix 4). In 2005,19.1% of Spanish indebted households had 
three times as much debt as GDI (BdE, 2008). This constitutes the third highest rise in 
household debt in the Eurozone and was recognized as unsustainable by the European 
Commission:
“The build-up of pressures is easily identified between 2002 and 2007, when the gap between 
the actual debt and its balanced or sustainable path increased rapidly.” (Cuerpo et al., 2013, p.4)
A major part of Spanish household debt is the main residence (56.8% of household debt) 
which is followed by other real estate properties (23.9%) whose median outstanding debt 
value has risen by 44.9% between 2002 and 2005 (BdE, 2008).
If not only debt levels are rising but also asset values, the economy can move into a fragile
state without detecting it. The perceived wealth effects validate past decisions and increase
optimism while lowering risk perceptions. Spanish households’ net wealth increased
significantly between 2002 and 2005 which can be seen in the rise of median household net
wealth by 68% (BdE, 2008). However, not only real wealth is essential for the validation
process but also financial wealth has to be taken into consideration. Even though financial
liabilities increased considerably, the level of net financial wealth did not change. This can
be seen in the households’ financial leverage ratio which stayed relatively stable at 92%
between 2002 and 2006 (see Figure 2 and Appendix 5).
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Figure 2 Household Wealth in % of GDP
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To find out the underlying development of households’ leverage, house and stock price 
changes are presented. While the debt-to-GDI ratio increased by 46 percentage points 
between 2002 and 2006, house prices increased by 100 percentage points. As shown below, 
the house prices per square meter, rose slowly since 1995 turning into a rapid increase since 
the beginning of 2000.
Figure 3 Residential Property Prices, Growth in %, Quarterly Data, Base Year 1995
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Source: Author’s calculation based on BIS (2016)
Besides the nominal increase in house prices, the deflated house price index showed a similar 
development. According to Eurostat (2015), this is an early warning indicator for 
unsustainable development of house prices with a threshold of 6% annual growth rate. 
During the boom years this indicator was constantly above this threshold (see Appendix 6).
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The real estate bubble coincided with a significant rise in the stock market prices; the Madrid 
Stock Exchange General Index rose by 82% between 2003 and 2005 (BdE, 2008).
Hence, not only households’ liabilities, but also assets rose considerably, showing an overall 
rise in households’ balance sheets. The rising debt-to-income and median debt levels for 
other real estate properties in connection with rising house prices are indicators for greater 
reliance on collateral-based debt and speculative behaviour of the household sector. Even 
though the debt-to-asset ratio does not show a significant increase, there is a risk of 
deteriorating remarkably as soon as the house prices fall. Thus, households’ economic risks 
increased due to being susceptible to financial market and house price changes (Sotiropoulos 
etal., 2013).
In the following, characteristics of the rising house demand are briefly presented. A high
proportion of households own their main residence (82%) and 87% of household wealth is
related to real estate which is significantly higher than the Eurozone average (60%; IMF,
2012). Furthermore, around 21% of households own a second home. The number of
households increased due to high birth rates, growing divorces and positive net migration
(BdE, 2008). Another factor is the “cultural attachment to property” which can be seen in
the fact that the first residence when moving out from the parents’ home is in the majority
of the cases an own home (Ball, 2009; Levitt, 2002). As a Financial Times article puts it:
"[...] the Spanish see a house as both an investment and a right" (Levitt, 2002)
Besides high domestic housing demand, purchase of secondary homes by other European
citizens also played a role. Annual net foreign investment in housing moved between 0.5
and 1% of GDP between 1999 and 2007 (De Lis and Herrero, 2008). Moreover, consumer
confidence was high after the Euro introduction. According to a European Commission
survey at the beginning of the 2000s, consumer confidence was the highest since 1990s:
“[...] decline in joblessness had impressed both consumers and executives with the result that 
consumers are more upbeat than the economists, who had warned of inflation and the weakened 
currency.” (United Press, 2000)
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Even though first warning signals of a property bubble were evident and published since
2004, optimism spread due to sustained high economic growth and rising income:
“The idea [housing bubble] has been raised in Spain, but most people in the financial sector and 
the government do not believe it really exists. Unlike the rest of Europe, Spain's economy has 
continued to grow by around 2%-3% per year, so the housing market has fairly solid 
foundations." (Head of Capital Markets, Caja Madrid, The Banker, 2004).
In sum, due to rising optimism after the Euro introduction, rising house demand contributed 
considerably to household debt. Rising house prices further fuelled the bubble and led to a 
feedback mechanism between house prices and debt.
After having seen the demand side of the housing bubble, the supply side is presented. 
Between 2002 and 2006 business investment in relation to GDP overall rose by 2.6 
percentage points with dwellings’ investment clearly sticking out (Eurostat, 2015). 
Investment in dwellings rose on average by 12% between 2002 and 2006 compared to 5.9%
between 1996 and 2001 which was also acknowledged by the Spanish government (OECD, 
2015):
“Construction, the other major component of gross fixed-capital formation, has been growing 
at a very rapid rate, due mainly to strong demand for housing.” (Kingdom of Spain, 2004, p.6)
Not only households went into high debt but also non-fmancial corporations had rising debt 
levels in connection with declining financial net worth (see Appendix 7). The share of debt 
by non-fmancial corporations even reached 132% of GDP in 2007 (see Figure 4). The debt- 
to-gross operating profit ratio of the real estate industry even rose by 650 percentage points 
between 2000 and 2007 (BdE, 2010).
Figure 4 Sectoral Debt to GDP ratios in %
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5.2 Sources of Financial Fragility
In the following, sources of financial fragility are discussed since financial fragility not only
depends on the willingness but also on the ability to borrow.
“In Spain, where economic growth is healthy, particularly compared with France and 
Germany, banks are expected by many to be among the best performing in the second quarter.” 
(Davies, 2005; emphasis added)
Despite rising debt levels, the Spanish economy including banks was considered to be 
healthy. Thus, the structure of the financial market is discussed. According to Goldsmith 
(1969), financial deepening takes place when outstanding credits grow faster than GDP 
which was the case in Spain indicating an expansionary credit cycle (BIS, OECD, 2015).
Figure 5 Credit to private non-financial sector, annual data in % of GDP
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Over half of the increasing credit went into construction and real estate industry, including 
real estate acquisition (mortgages 33%), 22% real estate development and 8% construction 
(IMF, 2012). Minsky argued that short-term debt increases during a bubble (Minsky, 1986a, 
pp.237-244). However, short-term debt as portion of overall household loans was low and 
moved between 4.55% and 5.24% while non-fmancial corporations’ short-term loan share 
also stayed constant (OECD, 2015).
Besides financial deepening, Cinquegrana (2010) defined indicators which point to an 
increasing importance of the financial sector, e.g. the credit intermediation ratio. This ratio
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puts loans by financial corporations in relation to liabilities issued by other sectors. Up until 
2002, it has been close to 1 and then constantly increased indicating that the financial 
corporations gained in importance.
Figure 6 Credit Intermediation Ratio
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Source: Cinquegrana (2010), p. 17
This rise in credit was, amongst others, possible because of declining borrowing rates. The 
reference interest rate for mortgages fell from 9.75 in 1995 to 2.25 in 2004. Real interest 
rates fell by 40% after the Euro introduction (see Appendix 8). Those decreasing interest 
rates led to only a moderate rise of debt service ratios, hence, they counterbalanced the rising 
debt levels of Spanish households. In 2005, the median indebted household used 17.1% of 
its income to cover debt, compared to 14.5% in 2002. However, 11.7% of the indebted 
households were financially distressed and used more than 40% of the gross income to pay 
debts which is an increase of 5% compared to 2002 (BdE, 2008). Furthermore, the debt 
service burden of non-fmancial corporations rose significantly after the Euro introduction 
and lay constantly above the Euro area average (ECB, 2012).
The described development was possible due to a deregulation process starting in the end of 
the 1970s. Spain's savings banks were liberalized and allowed to engage in commercial 
banking activities. In 2002, they were further liberalized and encouraged to give credits to 
households and small and medium sized enterprises (IMF, 2006). As a result of this
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deregulation process, the market share of savings banks grew rapidly and Spain had “more 
bank branches per capita than any in the world” (Burnett, 2006).
With the help of the Mortgage Market Regulation in 1981, a loan to value ratio of up to 80% 
(previously 50%) was allowed for mortgages, leading to middle and low income families to 
enter the market. In 1994, the Spanish government attempted to liberalize the housing 
finance market by making it easier to refinance. Thus, notary and registration fees were 
reduced and refinancing costs could be exempted from tax (Belsky and Retsina, 2004). The 
deregulation led to longer loan maturities and commercial banks entering the mortgage 
market. Furthermore, Spanish mortgages consist of variable rates or rate fixation of less than 
a year, accounting for 98% of the total amount of mortgages (IMF, 2012). Hence, a monetary 
policy change is quickly transmitted to the mortgage sector, transferring the risk from the 
financial to the household sector.
Despite rising competition, the level of financial innovation was quite low. The main 
provider of debt is still the banking sector. In 2000, a counter-cyclical measure of dynamic 
provisioning was constructed with the goal to smooth pro-cyclical credit behaviour. It forced 
the originator of, e.g. mortgage debt, to put capital aside as a provisioning (De Lis and 
Herrero, 2008). Even though a restriction of credit growth was not achieved due to the 
endogenous character of money creation, dynamic provisioning provided banks with a 
relatively good capital buffer (Suarez, 2010). Moreover, off-balance sheet items accounted 
only for 6-7% of all securities in 2008 and the main securitization device till date is mortgage 
backed securities. Thus, securitisation is less used for transferring risk but rather to provide 
funding. Furthermore, home equity withdrawals play only a minor role (De Lis and Herrero, 
2008).
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After the housing market slowed down, banks were seeking for new profit opportunities to
offset this market change. New aspects included immigrants (supported by a legalisation of
600,000 immigrants in 2006). BBVA, one of the two biggest banks in Spain, tapped the
immigrant market by offering loans with numerous co-signatories:
“They are an incredibly powerful market [...] Nobody wants to miss a slice of the cake.” 
(Professor of Finance, Burnett, 2006)
Not only banks but also construction companies found new profit opportunities such as
merger and acquisitions supported by credit money:
“There is more money than ever before to invest -  and it needs to go somewhere [...]. There is 
now a culture of ‘We have to grow’.” (Elkin, 2006)
This development shows remarkably the profit-seeking behaviour of financial institutions 
and their endogenous money creation.
Summing up, after the Euro adoption, interest rates declined significantly leading to low 
costs for mortgages. The easing of financial constraint and rise in consumer confidence led 
to an excessive credit demand in combination with rising house prices. A more diverse set 
of households including low income households had access to financial services and entered 
the housing market. Growing indebtedness of households not only made the households 
more vulnerable to shocks but also the economy dependent on households’ expectations 
about future income.
In addition to financial deregulation, financial markets became highly integrated. Gross 
capital inflows show a strong upward trend after the Euro introduction: an increase by 64.4% 
between 1999 and 2006 (see Figure 7). While gross capital inflows and outflows reached a 
relatively high level in 2000 (both over 20% of GDP), capital inflows clearly dominated 
thereafter (see Appendix 9). The rising external deficits per year caused the international 
investment position to increase by more than 30 percentage points of GDP from 2000 to
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2006; thus, Spain became vulnerable to changes in international financial markets (Appendix 
10; EC, 2009).
Figure 7 Growth Rates of Capital Flows, Credit Flows, House Prices
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Figure 7 also shows that rising house prices moved in line with gross capital inflows, whose 
steepest rise was before the steepest rise in credit flows. Thus, capital inflows preceded 
investment and were used to finance private sector deficits (EC, 2012). These are clear signs 
of an endogenous credit creation process fuelling a housing bubble.
Source: BIS (2015)
The inflows mainly came from Germany and France whose banks went through a period of
international expansion, leading to German and French banks increasing their claims on
Spain from 15% up to 20% - 25% of total external claims (Forster et al., 2011).
Figure 8 Consolidated foreign claims, by bank nationality, in millions of $
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In the beginning of the 2000s, Germany experienced a relatively sluggish economic growth, 
while Spain’s economic growth was significantly higher than the Eurozone average. 
Furthermore, huge differences in average bank profitability could be seen between Spain 
and Germany. German banks’ return on equity fell down to -2.7% in 2003 whereas Spain’s 
banking profitability lay on average at 12% between 2000 and 2006 (Goddard et al, 2010). 
At the same time, Germany had the second highest real short-term interest rates in the 
Eurozone (between 2000 and 2006 on average 1% higher; OECD, 2015). As soon as the 
gross capital inflows to Spain started to increase in 2003 (see Figure 8), Germany’s banking 
profitability recovered in the following three years, even reaching 11% in 2006 (Goddard et 
al., 2010). As shown below, capital inflows were mainly comprised of short-term finance. 
Thus, the case can be made that due to real short-term interest rate and economic growth 
differentials as well as elimination of currency risks after the Euro introduction, profit 
opportunities arose and attracted capital from Germany. The resulting growing financial 
flows were not directly provided for the companies and households but channelled through 
the banking sector.
Capital inflows were mainly comprised of portfolio investments followed by other 
investment (see Appendix 9). Thus, as Minsky (1990) states portfolio movements not 
multinational corporations and trade are the determining factors in modem capitalism. 
Minsky (1986b) also analysed the balance of payments statistics with the help of separating 
it into four different cash flows:
Tier 1: Trade (Goods and Services)
Tier 2: Income from foreign lending (factor service balance)
Tier 3: Net new foreign lending (long-term capital account)
Tier 4: Short-term capital movements
In order to apply Minsky’s classification to Spain, Tier 3 is defined as foreign direct
investment and Tier 4 includes portfolio investment, financial derivatives and other
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investment. Even though portfolio includes long-term and short-term investment, it is 
usually done with respect to financial yields and is easier to dispose of. Other investment 
mostly includes loans, currency and deposits (Cabrero et al., 2007). When looking at Spain, 
the first three tiers were financed with the help of short-term capital movements (see Figure 
9). Short-term financing in form of international currencies and deposits, a highly volatile 
source of finance, has accounted for a large part (42%) in this rise of short-term finance 
(OECD, 2015). Even though short-term financing includes repurchase agreements used by 
banks to draw liquidity from the ECB, those have been staying relatively stable between 
2000 and 2007 (Credite Suisse, 2012). Banks used inter-bank markets and long-term debt 
instruments to transmit short-term capital inflows to non-fmancial corporations and 
households (Suarez, 2010). According to Minsky (1986b, 1990), those developments are 
indicators for financial fragility and highly speculative behaviour.
Figure 9 Tiers of Capital Flows in % of GDP
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In sum, it was shown that large capital inflows, mainly from Germany, led to increasing 
credit availability, facilitated by the Spanish banking sector. Even though Spain could have 
borrowed cheaper domestically, it used expensive foreign short-term debt whose real interest 
rate was on average 2 percentage points higher than the domestic ones (see Appendix 11).
On the one hand, gross financial flows from the European centre were one of the driving 
forces in lifting the external financial constraint and leading to rising financial fragility. Due
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to the high returns offered by Spain, German banks increased their profitability considerably. 
On the other hand, positive expectations based on an expanding economy and a growing 
housing market, led Spanish banks to take on expensive foreign debt which can be seen as 
an irrational behaviour by the private sector. However, as Wray (2008) argues, agents 
develop their mental decision-making models based on current policies and expectations of 
future income and asset prices. Since during the boom those expectations are based on the 
current economic surroundings, agents can be considered to behave rationally when taking 
“on a Ponzi structure if they an ticipate  capital gains larger in scale than net cash-flow 
losses'” (Dymski, 1997, p.504; emphasis added). Given that nominal interest rates not only 
converged in the Eurozone but also declined considerably after the introduction of the Euro, 
Spanish banks took on foreign debt which was significantly cheaper than in previous periods 
but still more expensive in real terms. The declining domestic real interest rates further 
fuelled the Spanish demand. Only after the boom it becomes clear that those decision­
making models are based on wrong assumptions (Wray, 2008). Furthermore, assumptions 
can be reinforced by economic policies which will be discussed in the subsequent chapters.
5.3 Sectoral Financial Balances
Subsequently, the impact of economic policies is discussed. Up to 2002, Spain’s surplus and 
deficit behaviour was quite moderate (see Figure 10).
Figure 10 Sectoral Financial Balances in % of GDP
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In 2002, Spain started to run huge private sector deficits, even rising up to 11.9% of GDP in 
2007. In contrast, the public sector reduced its fiscal deficits from -6.50% of GDP in 1995 
to -0.03% of GDP in 2004 (IMF, 2015; OECD, 2015). Running a budget surplus in the case 
of a capital account surplus added to the rising fragility of the private sector.
For a more detailed analysis, the profit equation is analysed. Since the European System of 
National Accounts does not present corporate profits, gross operating surplus is taken as a 
proxy. It is the cost of intermediate goods and services and compensation of employees 
subtracted from gross output, hence, it does not take into consideration depreciation. Since 
Minsky’s (1986a) analysis is conducted out of a cash flow point of view and depreciation 
reflects no cash outflows, gross operating surplus seems to be an appropriate proxy. 
Furthermore, due to missing data concerning savings out of wages and consumption out of 
profits, Kalecki’s profit equation is simplified. Toporowski (1993) shows that it is suitable 
to replace savings out of wages and consumption out of profits with household’s net savings 
(SDf  equals household sector deficit). Corporate profits can rise due to rising investment, 
increasing budget deficit, rising household sector deficits and increasing current account 
deficits:
n = I + D f  — BD f  + SDf
In an empirical test of this assumption, it was shown that in 99% of the calculated cases, it 
led to the official data results (Toporowski, 1993). Thus, this profit equation is applied.
During an expansionary period, corporate profits are generally expected to rise. However, 
as shown below, gross operating surplus in relation to GDP stayed stable and belonged to 
the lowest levels in the Eurozone (see Table 5). In contrast, Germany’s corporations’ profits 
rose up to 27% in 2006 (AMECO, 2015). Furthermore, the calculated corporate profit even 
shows a slight decline during the boom period. The difference to the gross operating surplus
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could be due to subsidies which are still included in the calculation of gross operating surplus 
(Toporowski, 1993).
Table 5 Profit Equation Illustrated in % of GDP
Gross
Capital
Formation
Household
Saving
Public
Sector
Deficit
Current
Account
Deficit
Calculated
Corporate
Profits
Gross
Operating
Surplus
1999 24.9% 3.8% -1.5% -3.3% 19.3% 19.8%
2000 26.1% 4.1% -1.0% -4.4% 18.7% 19.9%
2001 26.2% 3.9% -0.6% -4.4% 18.5% 19.9%
2002 26.6% 3.7% -0.4% -3.7% 19.6% 19.9%
2003 27.7% 4.6% -0.4% -3.9% 19.5% 19.5%
2004 28.5% 3.5% 0.0% -5.6% 19.4% 19.5%
2005 29.9% 2.4% 1.2% -7.5% 18.8% 19.5%
2006 31.1% 1.3% 2.2% -9.0% 18.5% 19.7%
2007 31.1% 0.0% 2.0% -9.7% 19.3% 21.3%
2008 29.2% 1.5% -4.4% -9.3% 22.9% 23.2%
2009 24.3% 5.9% -11.0% -4.3% 25.1% 23.4%
2010 23.0% 2.8% -9.4% -3.9% 25.7% 23.0%
2011 21.4% 3.7% -9.4% -3.2% 24.0% 22.2%
2012 19.8% 2.1% -10.3% -0.3% 27.7% 23.1%
2013 18.5% 3.0% -6.8% 1.4% 23.8% 23.1%
Source: Author’s calculation based on AMECO (2015) and OECD (2015)
The downward pressure of improving government sector balance and rising current account 
deficit slightly outweighed the upward pressure by investment and household savings (by 
around 1 percentage points) leading to a decline of profits, thus, internal funds. As mentioned 
above, Spain offered relatively high financial yields which attracted capital inflows. Those 
rising capital inflows were channelled through the banking sector to households and 
companies; and in connection with high domestic demand led to rising investment based on 
debt and decreasing household savings, thus, financial fragility. As discussed above, in case 
of the private sector running a deficit, the external and/or the public sector have to finance 
it. However, since the public sector ran a balanced budget, the private sector deficit was 
financed with the help of further capital inflows, thus, rising current account deficits 
resulting in a downward pressure on corporate profits. Hence, it can be argued that lower 
financial yields would have prevented this process and the consequent housing bubble to 
develop. Therefore, it is essential to analyse qualitative changes in the fiscal balance in order 
to examine its influence on the attractiveness of capital.
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5.4 Role of Fiscal Policy
“[...] fiscal policy cannot serve as a fine-tuning instrument of demand-side adjustment when 
used by the authorities in a discretionary manner, divorced from the perceptions and 
expectations of economic agents. Not only is it inefficient in such cases, it can actually disturb 
economic activity [...] unpredictable measures sows confusion among economic agents, and 
engenders distrust o f market signs and signals. ” (Kingdom of Spain, 2001, pp. 19-20)
As can be seen above, Spain adopted a neoliberal approach with the belief that discretionary
fiscal policy can only do harm. However, since it has no control over its monetary policy, it
has to coordinate fiscal policy in such a way that the pro-cyclicality of financial markets is
counterbalanced. Hence, the size and scope of fiscal policy is discussed subsequently.
Size of G overnm ent
Minsky (1986a, pp.330-333) argues that government size in relation to GDP should be at 
least as large as private investment and be counter-cyclical to counterbalance financial 
fragility. This goal can be achieved either with the help of discretionary and/or automatic 
stabilisers. Government size, thus expenditures in relation to GDP, can work as an automatic 
stabilizer (Ferreiro et al., 2013). As seen in Figure 11, government spending has been 
continuously above gross capital formation. When comparing total expenditures excluding 
interest payments, the level of government spending seems to be in line with Minsky’s 
suggestions.
Figure 11 Public Spending/Gross Capital Formation in % of potential GDP
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However, public expenditures have been relatively low in comparison to the Eurozone (8% 
lower in 2005-2007), thus, it can be considered as too weak to work as an automatic stabilizer 
(Ferreiro et al, 2013). Furthermore, the budget was nearly balanced during the boom period. 
Those aspects fit to the fiscal policy stance announced. The goal of the Spanish government 
was to:
“[...] have a balanced budgetary position throughout the cycle, compatible with a sustained 
and dynamic reduction in the public sector’s weight within the economy. ’’(Kingdom of Spain,
2001, p.21)
This balanced budget was praised in the European press and by public officials:
“Budgetary stability has shown itself to be a key driver of a stable and credible macro- 
economic environment conducive to the general welfare, in which economic agents can make 
decisions with greater confidence of success [...] A change which has equipped the Spanish 
economy with greater resilience to external disturbances [...]” (Kingdom of Spain, 2003, pp.
5,7)
"It's the best result among the big European Union countries [...] which shows the success and 
efficiency of an economic policy at the service of growth and job creation." (Spanish Finance 
Minister, Agence Presse France, 2004)
However, it is questionable if it was due to a restrictive fiscal policy stance. There were no 
expenditure cuts and both revenues and expenditures rose (AMECO, 2015). Furthermore, a 
deficit appears as soon as housing boom related aspects are subtracted from the deficit. 
Suarez (2010) discounts fiscal deficits by taking out tax revenues related to construction and 
real estate. In his estimation, those sectors have driven up public revenues at the peak of the 
boom by 2.9% of GDP in 2006. The European Commission (2012) also points out that 75% 
of tax increases between 1995 and 2006 was due to the housing boom, thus, transitory. 
Hence, contrary to the public opinion, a balanced budget was not achieved due to following 
a restrictive stance but due to rising construction and real estate sector income.
By using the output gap and real GDP growth as indicators for pro-cyclical or counter­
cyclical fiscal policy, different phases can be identified (Ferreiro et al., 2013). To assess 
discretionary policy and adjust for automatic stabilizers, the structural public balance is 
examined. Spain followed an expansionary, pro-cyclical stance up until 2004 (see Table 6).
Table 6 Overview of Fiscal Policy Stance
Year Real
Economic 
Growth in
%
Output 
Gap in %
Public 
Balance 
in % of 
GDP
Structural 
Public 
Balance in 
% of GDP
Fiscal Policy 
Stance
Cyclicality of 
Fiscal Policy 
Stance
1999 4.48 1.3 -1.46 - Restrictive Counter-cyclical
2000 5.29 3.2 -1.02 -0.94 Expansionary Pro-cyclical
2001 4.00 3.5 -0.55 -0.77 Expansionary Pro-cyclical
2002 2.88 2.9 -0.42 -0.37 Expansionary Pro-cyclical
2003 3.19 2.5 -0.37 -0.21 Expansionary Pro-cyclical
2004 3.17 2.2 -0.03 0.04 Expansionary Pro-cyclical
2005 3.72 2.4 1.21 0.97 Restrictive Counter-cyclical
2006 4.17 3.1 2.19 1.23 Restrictive Counter-cyclical
2007 3.77 3.2 2.00 0.46 Restrictive Counter-cyclical
2008 1.12 1.3 -4.42 -5.60 Expansionary Pro-cyclical
Source: Author’s calculation based on OECD (2015), AMECO (2015), IMF (2015)
Before house prices started to decline and investors were leaving the market, the Spanish 
government adopted a restrictive, counter-cyclical policy stance in 2005. This can be seen 
in the fact that the structural budget was positive while at the same time having a positive 
output gap in those years. Qualitative aspects of the expansionary policy are examined 
subsequently.
Scope of Government
The Spanish government focused on a pro-growth strategy incorporating pro-market
policies. The goal was to catch up with other European economies:
“The strategy employed seeks, firstly, to boost the growth potential of the Spanish economy 
and, secondly, to continue laying the groundwork for the upkeep of a positive growth differential 
with respect to the EU’s most developed countries. The aim, in essence, is for the Spanish 
economy to grow faster than its main European partners through both expansion and contraction 
phases.” (Kingdom of Spain, 2002, p.8)
In the following housing policies in connection with fiscal policy scope are briefly outlined.
Housing Policies
Before lifting the restrictions on the rental sector in 1985, owner occupation was promoted
by freezing rents and allowing to transfer rental agreements to family members (Belsky and
Retsinas, 2004). Housing development was further promoted by introducing taxes in land
sales from regional and local governments leading to a rise in land sales to the private sector.
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The government supported low-cost homeownership with the help of subsidies for suppliers 
rather than increasing spending on social housing. Due to rising house prices and 
speculation, houses became unaffordable underlined by a non-functioning social housing 
and renting system. In 2002, the Spanish government introduced a new housing programme. 
It subsidized firms if they bought houses for letting and households to recover repair and 
insurance costs for 10 years if they let apartments (Ball, 2009). Despite these policy changes, 
the rental market stayed underdeveloped in comparison to other European countries (15% 
compared to 36% EU average, EC, 2012).
Government Revenues
In 2000, a corporate tax reform was introduced which was to benefit businesses in general
and to support small and medium sized enterprises. The definition for small and medium
sized enterprises was widened to include more companies (small enterprises tax regime for
up to 5 million euros turnover). Tax changes included, amongst others, tax deductible
goodwill and tax rate reduction for reinvested capital gains (Kingdom of Spain, 2001). In
2002, a personal income tax reform was introduced with the goal to:
“[...] lower the tax burden weighing on citizens, as a means to favour economic activity, [...] 
to mitigate the future pressure of pension liabilities on public finances, and to encourage more 
people into the labour market.” (Kingdom of Spain, 2002, p.20)
The tax reform reduced the lower income group taxes by around 38% and the highest income
tax rate from 48% to 45%. The average tax cut lay at 11% (Kingdom of Spain, 2002).
Additionally, taxes on economic activities were revised. Even though wealth tax on housing 
and inheritance tax exists in Spain, capital gains and imputed rent are exempted from 
taxation, 15% of the overall mortgage payments are deductible (Debelle, 2004; EC, 2012). 
Furthermore, large families are allowed to reduce the property tax burden by 90% (Kingdom 
of Spain, 2002). Such favourable credit terms affect the attractiveness of owning a house 
which is comparable to the effect of favourable treatment of interest payments for
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corporations (Debelle, 2004). Additionally, withholding tax was reduced to the lowest tax 
rate and excise taxes were frozen for two years leading to a reduction in real terms (Kingdom 
of Spain, 2002).
Government Expenditure
On the expenditure side, the focus also lay on pro-growth economic policies:
“[•■•] adjustment measures must ring-fence investment [...] the government will continue the 
strategy which has yielded such good results in the past few years, namely, the prioritisation of 
those spending items conducive to supply-side growth.” (Kingdom of Spain, 2001, pp. 9, 20)
The goal was to develop a knowledge-based society and supporting small and medium sized
enterprises since this area was considered ‘deficitary’. Expenditures were undertaken in the
fields of job creation, infrastructure, research and development. The goal was to double
research and development spending in order to converge with the European average
(Kingdom of Spain, 2004). The economic policy changes were seen as great accomplishment
which can lead Spain into full employment:
"We know we are not condemned to live with a high unemployment rate,” [...] Today, we 
know from experience what policies help to create jobs and those which do not.” (Spanish 
Prime Minister, Agence France Presse, 2003)
Furthermore, as mentioned above, a housing deficit was recognized and housing 
expenditures were increased by 32.5% in 2005. The budget for 2006 saw a further increase 
in housing expenditures of 20.6% (Kingdom of Spain, 2005).
In sum, it can be seen that Spain did use discretionary policy such as adjusting tax laws, thus, 
weakening automatic stabilizers. However, due to the strong economic growth, this did not 
lead to a decline in the government balance.
5.5 Role of Monetary Policy
The Euro introduction and financial market liberalization were seen as beneficial for Spain.
"For the Spanish economy, the advantages of being in a monetary union clearly outweigh the 
disadvantages" (Director for research at Bank of Spain, Landler, 2005)
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“We have always supported the elimination of European barriers and all measures that contribute 
to financial markets becoming more liquid and more efficient.” (Caruana, Governor of Bank of 
Spain, The Banker, 2006)
However, as a Eurozone member, Spain lost its monetary sovereignty and real interest and
exchange rates depend on a common monetary policy as well as price and wage differentials.
The ECB determines the short-term interest rate on main refinancing operations which is the
key interest rate in the euro area. Its monetary policy focuses on price stability and has been
considered to be working well in the beginning of the 2000’s:
"[...] the Governing Council agreed that in the pursuit of price stability it will aim to maintain 
inflation rates close to 2% over the medium term.” (ECB, 2003a) “More than four years of 
implementation have worked satisfactorily.” (ECB, 2003b)
While Spain has no direct influence on the key short-term interest rates, the long-term
interest rates are dependent on the individual country (ECB, 2015). Nevertheless, even the
long-term interest rates converged prior to 2007.
The Euro introduction in connection with low long-term interest rates and diverging real 
interest rates resulted in strong credit growth and increasing demand in some European 
countries such as Spain. As shown in section 5.2, Spain experienced low or even negative 
real interest rates during its boom years. However, since other European countries grew only 
moderately at the same time, the ECB did not have a clear direction as would have been the 
case when looking at only one country and adopted a stance fitting to core economies’ needs.
In 2003, the ECB’s key interest rate fell down to its so far lowest point of 2%. The reasoning
for a continuous decline to this level and for keeping it there until the end of 2005 was:
“EU banks were confronted with a challenging operating environment in 2002, largely owing 
to the global economic slowdown, which also affected the EU, as well as to further downward 
correction in turbulent global stock markets[...] (ECB, 2003a)
In 2004, Trichet stated that excess liquidity was prevalent in the Eurozone which bears the 
risk of inflationary pressures (based on consumer index):
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“[...] there is currently more liquidity than is needed to finance non-inflationary growth [...] 
should excess liquidity persist, it could lead to inflationary pressures over the medium term.” 
(ECB, 2004)
Hence, the key interest rate was raised at the end of 2005 (see Figure 12).
Figure 12 ECB Monthly Key Interest Rates
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With the increases in interest rates, Spanish investment first stagnated before it started to 
decline in 2008. When looking at investment separated into non-real estate related and real 
estate related investment (including construction, dwellings and other buildings and 
structures), a closer connection between interest rate change and investment becomes clear 
(see Figure 13). As soon as the ECB raised the key interest rate, real-estate related investment 
declined. This influence of the interest rates was also recognized by the Spanish government 
in 2005:
“Conversely, investment in construction will gradually decelerate due to [...], the gradual 
increase in interest rates” (Kingdom of Spain, 2005, p.l 1)
Figure 13 Annual Growth Rates of Real Estate Related/Non-Real Estate Related Investment
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Furthermore, it led to an increase of the debt service burden of households and non-financial
corporations. Due to having variable rate mortgages, households’ debt service burden rose
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significantly after 2005, reaching its highest level since 1993 in 2006 (Jamieson, 2006). At 
the same time, real estate firms' financial costs in relation to gross operating profit nearly 
doubled in just one year from 2006 to 2007 (BdE, 2010). While households’ financial 
leverage increased by 8.2%, non-financial corporations leverage even rose by 23.6% 
between 2006 and 2008 (see Appendix 5).
In the following, monetary policy in connection with fiscal policy are critically assessed 
since the effect of fiscal policy can either be dampened or amplified by monetary policy. If 
a government pursues an expansionary fiscal policy while applying a restrictive monetary 
policy, the increased spending or reduced taxes might be offset by the increasing borrowing 
costs (Ferreiro et al., 2013). Hence, the mix between fiscal and monetary policy has to be 
appropriate.
During the period of expansionary monetary policy, the Spanish government ran an 
expansionary fiscal policy, hence, both behaving pro-cyclical as shown in Table 7. In 2005, 
monetary and fiscal policy adopted a restrictive stance leading to the profit taking phase and 
in connection with the Global Financial Crisis to the burst of the bubble.
Table 7 Fiscal and Monetary Policy Stance
Year Fiscal Policy 
Stance
Cyclicality of 
Fiscal Policy
Change in 
the
average 
ECB 
interest 
rate (%)
Monetary 
Policy Stance
Cyclicality of 
Monetary Policy
1999 Restrictive Counter-cyclical 0 Restrictive Counter-cyclical
2000 Expansionary Pro-cyclical 1.14 Restrictive Counter-cyclical
2001 Expansionary Pro-cyclical -0.1 Expansionary Pro-cyclical
2002 Expansionary Pro-cyclical -1.19 Expansionary Pro-cyclical
2003 Expansionary Pro-cyclical -0.5 Expansionary Pro-cyclical
2004 Expansionary Pro-cyclical -0.25 Expansionary Pro-cvclical
2005 Restrictive Counter-cyclical 0.25 Restrictive Counter-cyclical
2006 Restrictive Counter-cyclical 0.75 Restrictive Counter-cyclical
2007 Restrictive Counter-cyclical 0.88 Restrictive Counter-cyclical
2008 Expansionary Pro-cyclical -0.44 Expansionary Pro-cyclical
Source: Author’s calculation based on ECB (2015) and Eurostat (2015)
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Even though the fiscal policy deficit was quite moderate during the expansionary period,
taxes in favour of mortgages and capital gains in connection with an expansionary monetary
policy amplified positive expectations. Due to overheating, Spain should have focused on a
counter-cyclical approach to offset the expansionary monetary policy and avoid internal and
external imbalances (De Lis and Herrero, 2008). This aspect was also recognized by the
Bank of Spain Governor Caruana:
"If in future — in a framework in which European monetary conditions continue to be 
relatively loose for the needs of the Spanish economy — demand pressures contribute to an 
inflation differential which is not justified by the process of real convergence, it may be 
advisable to move towards a budget surplus" (Jones, 2003)
With the help of the afore mentioned tax reforms, not only the automatic stabilizers were 
weakened but tax revenues rose, leading to a reduction of the Spanish gross government debt 
during the boom years (Eurostat, 2015). With the repayment of public debt and the Euro 
introduction, long-term interest rates decreased significantly which might have led to rising 
investment in other assets such as mortgage-backed securities. This can be seen in the 
issuance of securitization bonds twenty times as much in 2007 as in 2000, out of which 71% 
were mortgage-backed securities, mainly acquired by foreign institutions (Millan, 2014; De 
Lis and Herrero, 2008). Thus, it is essential to not only focus on a counter-cyclical approach 
but to ensure that the scope of fiscal policy aligns with the goal to reduce speculative finance 
demand resulting in less capital inflows, e.g. with the help of a capital gains tax.
Borio and Lowe (2002) warned of endogenous responses to monetary policy. If monetary
policy is considered credible, it might change the behaviour of the financial markets leading
to financial imbalances. As can be seen in the development above and in the appraisal of the
Euro in the press, not only monetary but also fiscal policy were considered to be credible
leading to positive expectations. However, mid-2004, press reports started to change and the
relationship between house prices and low interest rates was discussed more extensively.
“When you have had a long period of low interest rates and long maturities, it is important that 
people take into account the possibility of higher interest rate levels.” (Member of ECB 
governing council, Atkins and Crawford, 2005)
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“[...] housing price cannot be sustained indefinitely [...] “The Spanish economy and particularly 
its households are now undeniably more vulnerable to adverse developments, especially to a 
potentially greater-than-expected hike in interest rates."(Bank of Spain Governor, Atkins and 
Crawford, 2005)
Nevertheless, it was made clear by Trichet in mid-2005 that monetary policy would not 
adjust its strategy:
“Not all boom or bubble episodes threaten financial stability. Policy-makers should not fall into 
the trap of attempting to eliminate all risk from the financial system.” (ECB, 2005)
By switching the policy stance in 2005 in a financially fragile environment, the financial 
distress was exacerbated.
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6. Findings
In this concluding chapter, main characteristics of applying Minsky’s financial instability 
hypothesis in an open economy are provided, followed by a macroeconomic framework 
including economic policies.
6.1 Minsky in an Open Economy
Spain experienced an impressive housing bubble with soaring household and non-financial 
corporate sector debt which can be partly explained by changes in exogenous factors such 
as rising number of households. However, those factors are not sufficient to explain the huge 
capital inflows and extreme rise in property prices. Thus, exogenous factors are combined 
with Minsky’s endogenous factors.
In extending Minsky’s model, Arestis and Glickman (2002) argue that a displacement in 
form of financial deregulation and a fixed exchange rate lead to profit opportunities due to 
interest rate differentials. Economic agents take on cheap short-term foreign debt to finance 
domestic long-term investment. Bagnai (2012) states that this is based on nominal interest 
rates. However, in the case of Spain, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed since the Eurozone 
has one nominal key interest rate and nominal long-term interest rates converged. 
Furthermore, when looking at the nominal interest rate spreads provided by Bagnai (2012), 
spreads between Spain and Germany on households’ and corporations’ debt are negative. 
Solely, the spread on house purchase loans was positive. Nevertheless, it is questionable how 
Germany’s house loan interest rate might have influenced capital flows into Spain.
In contrast, it was demonstrated that due to arising profit opportunities, financial flows from
the European core were the driving force in the rising fragility. Spanish real short-term
interest rates were significantly lower compared to Germany. Even though Spanish banks
could have made on the carry domestically due to the spread between real short-term and
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long-term interest rates, they borrowed expensive short-term debt. With low economic 
growth and high real short-term interest rates, German investors were looking for profit 
opportunities. After the Euro introduction, exchange rate and currency risks were removed 
and the spread between core and periphery countries set off the mechanism attracting foreign 
capital. Thus, Spanish capital flows are caused by interest rate differentials but the causality 
is reversed.
Table 8 Overview of Displacement Stage
Features Closed Economy Open Economy Spanish Economy
Displacement (1999-2001)
Profit increase in one 
sector
Private sector (m ain 
focus on 
corporations)
Private or external 
sector (corporations 
and households)
In terest rate 
differentials: low 
foreign interest rates, 
high dom estic interest 
rates
H uge capital inflow s
R ising gross capital 
fo rm ation  in 
household /construction  
sector
In terest rate 
d ifferentials: high 
foreign in terest rates, 
low dom estic interest 
rates
During the subsequent boom and euphoria phase, credit availability increased and profit
expectations were rising. In a closed economy, this would entail domestic banks creating 
money to fulfil an economy’s liquidity needs. However, since Spain is an open economy and 
a member of a monetary union, capital inflows were used to finance rising private sector 
deficits. The rising capital inflows and growing liquidity further reduced interest rates, 
hence, borrowing costs. Therefore, the external sector not only played an essential role in 
the displacement but also in the rising credit availability in Spain.
The rise in credit was followed by real estate related investment. Households’ wealth and 
gross disposable income rose resulting in a positive feedback mechanism. As seen in the 
qualitative analysis, positive expectations played a major role in rising liquidity demand. 
Rising debt-to-income and house price levels were indicators for greater reliance on 
collateral, thus, Ponzi finance which was possible due to a prior deregulation process. Even
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though this was taking place in a relatively seen conservative way with a low degree of 
financial innovation, it led to endogenous money creation enabling more households to take 
on debt. Mortgages with variable interest rates in connection with rising external short-term 
debt added to the vulnerability of the Spanish economy.
Table 9 Overview of Boom and Euphoria Stage
Features Closed Economy Open Economy Spanish Economy
Boom Phase (2000-2007) and Euphoria Phase (2002-2006)
Extensive credit 
availab ility
C redit creation by 
dom estic banks
C redit creation by 
dom estic banks and 
foreign banks
C redit creation with 
the help o f  foreign 
capital inflow s
Investm ent and 
asse t price
L ow  short-term  
in terest rates
A sset prices and 
investm ent go up (focus 
on corporations)
Low  dom estic short­
term  interest rates
Investm ent and asset 
prices supported by 
gross capital inflow s
D om estic interest 
rates fall relative to 
foreign interest rates
H uge gross capital 
inflow s used in non­
tradable sector
R ising house prices
D om estic and foreign 
interest rates fall
F inancial
innovation
D om estic financial 
institutions invent new  
financial products
Financial products are 
extended to external 
sector w ith the help o f  
securitisation
M ain focus on 
banking sector (hardly 
no off-balance sheet 
item s)
Margins of Safety go down
D ebt levels go up D om estic debt rises D om estic and foreign 
debt rises
D om estic and foreign 
debt levels rise focus 
on real estate
Short-term  rises Short-term  dom estic 
debt
Short-term  dom estic 
and external debt
Short-term  external 
debt
With the housing market slowing down in 2006, property developers searched for new profit
opportunities which were found in mergers and acquisition.
Table 10 Overview of Profit Taking Stage
Features Closed Economy Open Economy Spanish Economy
Profit Taking (2004-2006)
W ell inform ed 
investors leave the 
m arket
Investm ent in 
different dom estic 
sector
Investm ent in 
d ifferent dom estic 
sector/external sector
M ergers and 
acquisitions
After having discussed Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis in an open economy, the
question remains what role exogenous factors such as fiscal and monetary policy play in the 
development of the property bubble.
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6.2 M acroeconomic Framework
“  Unless we understand what it is that leads to economic and financial instability, we 
cannot prescribe-make policy-to modify or eliminate it. ”
(Minsky, 1986a, p. I l l )
Before being able to make policies, it is essential to understand the mechanisms leading to 
financial fragility. The above discussed causal chain can be summarized as followed:
Profit
opportunities
Capital
inflows
Asset price Current
account
deficit
Fragility
increases
Capital inflows, thus, the financial sector should be regarded as the root cause of the Spanish 
crisis. Huge gross capital inflows led to rising credit flows resulting in exceptional housing 
investment levels. By a Minskian validation process more investment was generated, asset 
prices rose and financial fragility grew. However, in the case of Spain, this was not due to 
financial innovation or nominal interest rate differentials, but due to the search of profit 
opportunities by the European core. The housing boom was based on positive expectations 
which are, amongst others, dependent on factors such as interest rate levels or preferential 
tax laws. Hence, it is important to examine fiscal and monetary policy.
In 2005, Bemanke argued that the main cause of macroeconomic imbalances can be 
attributed to the excess savings of developing countries which export those to advanced 
economies (called the ‘savings glut’). This argumentation has been taken up to exculpate 
policymakers in the US from following wrong policy goals (Mees, 2011). However, the 
‘savings glut' view does not distinguish between savings and financing. It is the financing 
provided ex ante which lead to higher savings ex post (Borio and Disyatat, 2011). Shin 
(2011) argued as well that the ‘savings glut' does not apply to the European case since it 
rather was the outcome of extensive cross-border lending by banks than the provision of 
German deposits. As shown above, cross-border lending by German banks increased 
considerably after the Euro introduction. Thus, fiscal policy and its influence on credit
demand and the resulting housing bubble is essential.
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In the boom years, Spain’s government adopted a pro-cyclical fiscal policy stance. The focus 
lay on pro-growth strategies with beneficial tax laws for capital gains and home ownership. 
This took place while the Eurozone adopted an expansionary monetary policy. Short-term 
interest rates decreased leading to rising credit availability and declining long-term interest 
rates. Hence, the boom was reinforced with the help of low debt service costs and an easy 
access to finance, thus lifting financial constraints and leading to an underestimation of risk. 
Pro-cyclical monetary and fiscal policy amplified positive expectations and supported the 
credit creation mechanism. It became clear that fiscal policy should have adopted a 
restrictive, counter-cyclical stance to dampen optimistic expectations. Minsky (1986a, pp. 
336-337, 341) also argues in favour of surpluses during expansion times and a socially 
sustainable scope of fiscal policy. Such a restrictive counter-cyclical stance would need to 
be supported by an appropriate monetary policy. However, since Spain belongs to a 
monetary union, monetary policy cannot be adjusted to each economically different member 
country. Thus, the focus should be less on favourable tax laws for capital gains and more on 
beneficial taxes for social and sustainable projects on improving infrastructure, education 
and health care (Minsky, 1986a).
Figure 14 Adjusted Crisis Model
• Deregulation and financial integration 
•Rising capital inflows
• Financial flows into non-productive investment 
•Asset prices rise
•Passive cross-border capital flow  and pro-growth policies
•Endogenous movem ent from  hedge to  collateral-based Ponzi finance 
•Expansionary m onetary policy and fiscal policy
•Investors flee the market 
•Restrictive monetary and fiscal policy
Source: Adapted from Kindleberger & Aliber (2005)
In 2005, fiscal and monetary policy changed to a restrictive stance. As soon as the ECB
changed the monetary policy, real-estate related investment went down resulting in the profit
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taking phase. The special case in Spain is that changes in key interest rates are immediately 
transmitted into mortgage rates. Hence, debt service burdens rose, leading to a deepening 
of financial fragility. Furthermore, a restrictive fiscal policy increased the pressure on profits. 
As shown with the help of sectoral balances, it became clear that decreasing budget deficits 
drove the private sector further into financial fragility because of having to run a deficit in 
the case of a current account deficit. Thus, not only could a balanced budget not be used to 
counter-balance but it reinforced the rising fragility in the private sector.
Even though the government was aware of the increasing private and external sector deficit, 
the boom was supported prior to 2005, instead of reducing attractiveness of capital inflows 
with less favourable tax laws. As its policy changed to a restrictive stance, financial distress 
increased by switching policy direction in an environment with high financial fragility. 
Hence, economic policy plays an essential role in the development of increasing fragility 
and has to be added to the framework.
6.3 Implications of Findings
This research has investigated the role of economic policies in the formulation of real estate 
bubbles. The descriptive analysis was useful in offering insights into the application of 
Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis in an open economy. This was supported by a 
qualitative review of documents in order to explore reasons of policies and development of 
expectations. Hence, it contributes to the existing literature by embedding qualitative into 
quantitative methods in describing the influence of economic policies on financial fragility 
development.
As shown in the literature review, the discussion of the trigger of an asset bubble has
increased in recent years. However, it is surprisingly difficult to find a systematic discussion
of fiscal and monetary policy in the bubble development. It was shown that Spain
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experienced an exogenous trigger in form of the Euro introduction which through 
endogenous factors including positive expectations and capital inflows led to financial 
fragility. The case was made that due to a search for profits by the European core, financial 
profit opportunities determined endogenously capital flows’ direction. Pro-growth fiscal 
policy and expansionary monetary policy were amplifying positive expectations.
Further research on the causes and consequences of wider economic crises and the influence 
of macro-economic policies needs to be conducted. The causality between external and 
private sector deficit needs to be explored further to define in a detailed way the underlying 
mechanism. It would be interesting to see how the financial instability hypothesis applies in 
different institutional settings since events might be contingent. Thus, a comparative case 
study approach could be helpful.
In this context, motivational factors influencing risk perceptions need to be investigated. One 
major contribution of Minsky (1986a) is the endogenous movement of an economy towards 
fragility based on positive expectations of future profits. Due to this endogeneity of 
economic expectations, it is essential to explore how risk-taking increases depending on 
changing perceptions of economic uncertainty and positive attitudes towards government 
policies. As Minsky (1986a) states real world problems cannot be depicted with the help of 
quantitative models. Therefore, a qualitative analysis is essential to explore underlying 
factors influencing risk perceptions and expectations of economic agents and to describe the 
dynamics in the transition towards financial fragility.
A questionnaire with open-ended and closed questions could be useful to provide an analysis 
of motivational factors and connect them to Minsky’s cycles. The general perception of risk, 
uncertainty as well as extensive optimism and factors influencing them could be examined 
(see Appendix 12). Since Spain did not use equity withdrawals, it also needs to be
investigated how changing wealth perceptions contributed to the property bubble. 
Furthermore, the role of mortgage terms on households’ risk perception need to be explored, 
especially the difference between variable and fixed interest rates. The main emphasis would 
be on how financial instability may build up during a non-crisis situation.
Lastly, the financialisation and income inequality argument put forward by an extensive 
literature needs to be critically assessed. In Spain, the degree of financialisation in the form 
of ever evolving financial innovation did not take place. A property bubble developed 
despite a relatively conservative dynamic provisioning system, low density of other asset 
backed securitisation besides mortgages, and nearly no off-balance sheet items. Furthermore, 
inequality prior to the crisis did not play a role in Spain. In sum, this research helped to 
identify the first implications of applying Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis to an 
open economy with taking into consideration economic policies’ impact and identified 
aspects which need further investigation.
6.4 Limitations
This research was conducted as an indicative study. Due to limitations of size, it was not 
possible to examine further underlying factors. First, historical patterns cannot be detected. 
The Spanish housing policy prior to the 1990s which influences the total home ownership 
and its institutional background could not be investigated. Second, surrounding factors such 
as political background or terrorist attacks in the beginning of the 2000s and their impact on 
policy changes and expectations were excluded. Third, cross-sectional differences in age and 
income could not be captured here. However, this aspect plays an important role in assessing 
households’ ability to deal with shocks such as unemployment, interest rate and house price 
changes since the disaggregated numbers might differ significantly from the aggregated 
numbers. Finally, this indicative study deals only with the causes and not the consequences 
of rising financial fragility, namely financial instability.
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Appendix 2 Analytical note on Kalecki’s profit equation
Both the sectoral balances as well as Kalecki’s profit equation can be derived from the 
balances of identity presented in section 4.2 with S  as private savings, I  as private investment, 
G as government spending, T as taxes received , X as exports and M as imports:
( S - / )  =  ( G - D  +  ( X - A f )  (1)
Kalecki assumes that there are two classes comprised of workers and capitalists. According 
to Wray (2012b), the private balance saving (S — /) can be replaced by profits (7r) profits 
minus investment plus saving out of wages (Sw ) less consumption out of profits (Cn):
n -  I + (Sw) -  Cn = (G — T) + (X — M) (2)
This equation can be rearranged and one gets:
n = I - S w +  C n + ( G - T )  + ( X - M )  (3)
Assuming the government balance is negative, it portrays the government’s deficit (Df )  
stated in Kalecki’s profit equation and if the external sector runs net imports instead of net 
exports, it shows as current account deficit (BDf ):
n  =  I +  Df  -  BDf  - S w  + Cn (4)
Both equations, sectoral balances approach and the profit equation, can be directly derived 
from the national accounting identity which states that GDP equals consumption plus 
investment plus net exports plus government spending. Thus, both equations state an ex-post 
relationship and do not explain causality, contradictory to Kalecki’s assumption (Bagnai, 
2012). However, the accounting identity can be used to identity which aspects need to be 
explained.
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Documents Amount Years
Analysed
Key Search Themes
Stability Programmes 
of Spain -  Bank of 
Spain
ECB documents 
published online
Financial Times
20
10
The Banker
2001,2002, 2003,2004, 
2005, 2006
ECB press releases online 
2002-2006 (search by 
activity)
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Economic Growth
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Financial Stability
Spanish Economic Policy, 
Spanish Housing 
Boom/Real Estate Sector, 
Economic Growth
The Main Wire
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Newspapers included: 
Agence France Presse, 
Associated Press,
Daily Mail, Daily 
Telegraph, Irish Times, 
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Newsweek, Sunday 
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Tribune, The 
Scotsman, United 
Press International, 
Washington Post
14 23/03/2004,05/04/2004
29/06/2004, 05/07/2004 
22/03/2005, 11/05/2005, 
13/05/2005 22/06/2005, 
06/07/2005 22/10/2005, 
15/11/2005,05/01/2006 
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Governor of the Bank of 
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Economic Growth
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Appendix 4 Gross Debt to Income of Households
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Appendix 5 Financial Leverage Ratios
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7 Debt = loans and securities other than shares, Assets = currency, deposits, securities other than share, loans, 
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Appendix 6 House price index, deflated in %, Annual Average Rate of Change
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Appendix 7 Sectoral Net Financial W orth in % of GDP
150%
50%
0%
2 0 0 0  2 0 0 1  200 2  2003  2 0 0 4  2005  2 0 0 6  2 007  2 008  2009  2 010  2011
-150%
- 200 %
Total Econom y H ouseholds Non-financial corporations
Source: OECD (2015)
XX
Appendix 8 Development of Interest Rates in %
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Appendix 9 Gross Capital Flows in % of GDP, 1999-2013
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
- 10%
- 20 %
-30%
I
2009  2
y Direct Investm ent abroad  
U Portfolio Investm ent A ssets 
y  Financial Derivatives Balance 
li O ther Investm ent Liabilities
H Direct Investm ent in reporting eco n o m y  
ki Portfolio Investm ent Liabilities 
y O ther Investm ent A ssets
Source: OECD (2015)
XXI
20
14
Appendix 10 International Investment Position in % of GDP
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Appendix 11 Euro Area Real Short-term Interest Rates in %
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Appendix 12 Motivational Factors in a Minsky Cycle
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